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14
15 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
16 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
17 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**
18

19 DELPHINE ALLEN, et al.,
20 Plaintiffs,
21 v.
22 CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,
23 Defendants.

Case No. C-00-4599 TEH

**DECLARATION OF OAKLAND CITY
ADMINISTRATOR DEANNA J.
SANTANA IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER**

24
25 I, DEANNA J. SANTANA, declare as follows:

26 1. I, Deanna J. Santana, declare that the representations set forth in this
27 declaration are true to the best of my knowledge. The representations set forth in this
28 declaration are based on both my personal knowledge except where indicated are based

1 on my information and belief. If called upon, I will competently testify to the truth and
2 veracity of the representations set forth in this declaration.

3 2. I have approximately 18 years' experience in public administration and hold
4 a Master of City Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and two
5 Bachelor of Arts from U.C. Berkeley.

6 3. I have been employed as City Administrator of the City of Oakland ("City" or
7 "Oakland") since August 1, 2011. Prior to becoming City Administrator, I served in
8 various executive level capacities for the City of San Jose, a City nationally recognized
9 for being well managed and the nation's 10th largest City, for example, **Deputy City**
10 **Manager** for the City of San Jose where I was responsible for oversight of the Public
11 Safety Services Area (e.g., San Jose Police Department, San Jose Fire Department,
12 Office of Emergency Services, and liaison to the Independent Police Auditor); **Chief of**
13 **Staff to the City Manager** where I was responsible for executive level support to the City
14 Manager with his City Charter responsibilities; and, other executive level positions that
15 required that I lead high-profile projects.

16 4. I was selected by Mayor Chuck Reed to serve on his Mayoral Transition
17 Committee where I served as one of three individuals to support the leadership
18 changeover from Mayor Gonzales to Mayor Reed. Because of my strong leadership and
19 change-management skills, I was the only City employee selected to lead the
20 Administration (comprised, at that time, of an approximately \$3B budget and 7,000
21 employees) through the transition.

22 **Authority and Professional Assessment**

23 5. As the City Administrator, I have three core responsibilities: (a) oversee the
24 day-to-day operations of the City; (b) strategic planning and leadership; and, (c) support
25 legislative policy goals with the Mayor and City Council.

26 6. I am responsible for my City Charter authority which includes:
27 recommending entering into contracts that need City Council approval, enforcement of all
28 laws and ordinances and policies of the Council and administering the affairs of the City.

1 7. I prepare an annual budget for the Mayor and I to submit to the City
2 Council. During the past year, I have closely worked with the Chief of Police and his staff
3 to support the Oakland Police Department (OPD) with its efforts to achieve NSA
4 compliance and implement best professional police practices. This includes putting in
5 place the necessary resources to support task compliance, making changes throughout
6 the organization to appropriately assign resources, regularly meeting with OPD on efforts
7 and putting in place longer-term efforts that will improve police services.

8 8. I am knowledgeable of the NSA and the status of tasks which must be
9 completed. In my first year as City Administrator, I put forward a significant effort to learn
10 about the current OPD state of management, functions, and organization by:

- 11 a) Attending numerous Line-Ups to personally introduce myself and establish
12 in-person rapport with OPD staff;
- 13 b) Participating in many "Rides-A-Long" to become directly familiar with the
14 field conditions that police officers encounter, procedures, work
15 environment, and overall day-to-day OPD operations;
- 16 c) Maintaining regular direct communication with the entire OPD by emailing
17 key messages from the City Administrator, weekly City wide activity
18 memorandums, and Citywide employee messages on key events facing our
19 City;
- 20 d) Participated in promotional interviews to assess desired characteristics of
21 OPD leaders, as well as participating in the planning for the police
22 academy;
- 23 e) Examining the internal affairs process with a focus on outcomes, potential
24 bias, and/or process improvements that better serve all parties involved in
25 the process;
- 26 f) Regularly participating in OPD's CompStat meetings to inform myself about
27 crime trends, data used, crime prevention efforts developed, and how crime
28 patterns are developing within the City;

- 1 g) Assessing OPD organizational structure to determine needs, resources,
2 and learn about how the OPD functions;
- 3 h) Regularly listening to the Police Radio to listen as incidents occur and
4 obtain deeper knowledge of OPD's communication skills, transactions,
5 instructions, and overall choice of words to describe situations/incidents;
6 and,
- 7 i) Working closely with the Department to monitor staffing and budget to
8 better determine resource availability and capacity to advance NSA
9 compliance.

10 9. The City is in Phase 1 compliance with all 22 Tasks and, according to the
11 11th Quarter Report, the City is in compliance with 12 of the 22 Tasks for Phase 2. The
12 exact status of compliance is set forth in specificity in the declarations attached in support
13 of this Opposition of Chief of Police Howard Jordan and Deputy Chief of Police Sean
14 Whent.

15 10. As City Administrator, I fully recognize that the OPD should have been in
16 compliance or have achieved a higher level of compliance. From my perspective, there
17 are many contributing factors that have led to the current state, including, but not limited
18 to a very high turnover rate among executive police commanders; inability of OPD to
19 secure resources necessary for NSA compliance during an unprecedented global
20 recession; lack of aligned executive leadership (e.g., Mayor, City Administrator, and Chief
21 of Police). I have also concluded that the most recent phases of attempting to achieve
22 compliance have been impeded by an inherently flawed Compliance Model.

23 11. Leadership stability and heightened-focus over the past year has effectively
24 addressed work plans for advancing compliance, obtaining necessary resources, and has
25 made NSA compliance as a City priority.

26 12. A combination of executive leadership turnover over the last five or so years
27 at the Mayor, City Administrator, and Chief of Police levels, OPD "brain drain" due to
28 frequent high level command staff turnover, budget cuts resulting in sworn staffing

1 reductions and inability to invest in training has led to an OPD that requires stability,
2 focused leadership, increased staffing, and investment in equipment and training in order
3 to achieve NSA compliance and to effectively fight crime in the City of Oakland.

4 13. As an executive with approximately twenty (20) years of experience, I have
5 led change in large organizations. I know first-hand that permanent change does not
6 happen without stable leadership or without investment in equipment and training. While
7 I recognize that 10 years is excessive, I believe that the above matters have a direct
8 adverse impact to achieving change in the OPD.

9 **Focused and Stable Leadership Team**

10 14. The Mayor, Chief of Police and I work as a team to provide effective
11 leadership to advance NSA compliance.

12 15. This work includes making the civilian complaint process easier to register
13 complaints of allegations of inappropriate police conduct, placing the OPD Office of
14 Inspector General under the administration of City Administrator, and requesting budget
15 allocations for recruitment, academies, training, and crime reduction.

16 16. The initiatives of Mayor Quan, Chief Jordan, and I are set forth in detail in
17 the Declaration of Howard Jordan and include the Organizational Assessment that the
18 City has contracted Robert Wasserman of the Strategic Policy Partnership ("SPP") to
19 conduct of the OPD.

20 17. The Organizational Assessment is the City's response to various
21 discussions with the Monitor, Plaintiffs' Attorneys, and OPD staff as to what is needed
22 systemically to implement sustained compliance with the NSA.

23 18. SPP's core task is to assess, make recommendations and assist the City
24 with what is necessary to implement systemic change that will enable the City to comply
25 with the NSA and will achieve sustained best professional policing practices throughout
26 the OPD.

27 19. The City is making the necessary changes to put management systems in
28 place at OPD that will result in sustainable NSA compliance.

1 20. These systems are being implemented despite difficult budget times and
2 ratings that continue to cause economic “stagnation” in the City’s finances.

3 21. For context, the City’s budget reduction of approximately \$318M and 720
4 FTE staff over approximately six (6) years, significantly impacted the level of resources
5 necessary to accelerate NSA Task compliance. OPD sworn staffing has been reduced
6 approximately 25%, from a high of 837 to approximately 627, during a time when violent
7 crime has increased about 20%. Civilian staff assigned to OPD has been equally
8 impacted (394 FTEs to 261—a 34% reduction).

9 22. Although the City is a full-service organization that provides a broad range
10 of needed services to the community, reductions in the OPD budget resulted in a lack of
11 training and significant loss of personnel, critical factors of its ability to achieve
12 compliance.

13 23. The Mayor, Chief of Police and I have been and remain resolute in
14 rebuilding, strengthening, and “growing” the OPD in areas that directly support NSA
15 compliance and improved community services.

16 24. We did not propose or make any cuts to the OPD when faced with a budget
17 deficit in January 2012. In June 2012, when modest revenues were realized for the first
18 time in four (4) years, we recommended funding for needed police training academies,
19 organizational assessments, increased risk management functions, transfer of the Office
20 of Inspector General from OPD to CAO, funding for complaint intake staff to be
21 transferred to the City Administrator’s Office, Citizens Police Review Board (CPRB),
22 technology staffing and equipment, training, and independent investigations. (Exh. A)
23 We have swiftly moved to advance needed funding requests to put these initiatives in
24 place and invest in key areas for OPD.

25 25. In as much as we have been able to put the above changes in place over a
26 year’s time, OPD still requires additional investment in training, and must inculcate a
27 stronger value and commitment to continuous learning and adapting to an ever changing
28 law enforcement landscape.

1 26. As the Mayor and I issue the City's 5-Year Financial Plan (a plan that has
2 not been issued since about 2003), we are recommending funding allocations to continue
3 to rebuild and strengthen the OPD: two police academies per fiscal year for five years,
4 which will result in attaining a sworn force of just over 800 (subject to Council approval);
5 up to \$5,000,000 earmarked for strategic initiatives that continue to address gaps that
6 require focused work-plans and remedies (e.g., training, equipment, contracted services,
7 limited-duration staffing, change management, etc.) to advance crime suppression and
8 improved policing service; and, we will recommend to the City Council a contract
9 amendment for the development of a Citywide Crime Reduction Plan to strategically tie
10 together the many crime fighting efforts underway in Oakland. (Exh. B)

11 27. We have initiated a process that will result in a financing plan for new
12 technology systems at OPD. The current CAD, RMS, and iPAS systems have passed
13 their useful life and require replacement in the near term. The iPAS procurement process
14 is underway. In fact, on November 27, 2012, the Administration will recommend, to the
15 City Council for approval, a technical consultant to lead the implementation of this effort.
16 Acquisition of this new technology will greatly aid the OPD to augment accountability,
17 streamline work processes, create more workload capacity, and support fighting crime in
18 Oakland. This is in addition to the replacement of a Captain of Police to oversee
19 technology implementation, to a professional Information Technology Program Manager.
20 (Exh. B)

21 28. Our team has not been stagnant in advancing strategic initiatives and
22 cobbling necessary resources to support these efforts that fundamentally change the
23 OPD structure, systems, and service to the community—efforts that serve to create a
24 strong foundation to sustain compliance.

25 29. One example of advancing strategic initiatives that demonstrates our quest
26 for an independent analysis of the current state of the OPD includes obtaining an
27 independent review of the "Occupy Oakland" events that occurred on October 25, 2011
28 as well as an organizational assessment to be conducted by Robert Wasserman of the

1 Strategic Policy Partnership. Both of these efforts demonstrate that the Executive
2 Leadership seeks comprehensive input on areas for the OPD to initiate further
3 improvements. We have not shied away from the reality of the current state of the OPD.
4 We have accepted any findings and added them to the OPD's work-plan for systemic
5 change—beyond NSA Task Compliance.

6 30. As referenced above, the City contracted with the Frazier Group to provide
7 an independent assessment of the Department's response to the October 25, 2011
8 Occupy Oakland protests. When I first reviewed the report, I realized that it not only
9 lacked information, but it also contained factual inaccuracies. Specifically, the Frazier
10 Group failed to interview three key officials: District Attorney O'Malley, Sheriff Ahern, and
11 Deputy City Administrator Arturo Sanchez. These officials played a significant role in the
12 coordinated response and investigation of the Occupy Oakland Protests. As a result of
13 the Frazier Group's failure to interview these officials, the report inaccurately described
14 certain actions taken in response to the Occupy Oakland Protests.

15 32. Because the Frazier Group's report reached significant conclusions about
16 the deployment of mutual aid (an effort coordinated by Sheriff Ahern), the status of
17 criminal investigations into events related to the October 25 protests (conducted by the
18 District Attorney's Office), and the City's planning and decision-making leading up to the
19 event (coordinated by Deputy City Administrator Arturo Sanchez), the report seemed
20 highly incomplete without the perspective of these key officials. I informed the Frazier
21 Group that the report must include a complete and accurate factual record so that the
22 recommendations would be relevant. I therefore recommended that Deputy City
23 Administrator Sanchez should be interviewed by the Frazier Group and provided the draft
24 report to Sheriff Ahern and District Attorney O'Malley.

25 The errors, omissions and inconsistencies that I pointed out during this process
26 did not change the findings or recommendations in the investigation, nor was that my
27 intention. Indeed, Chief Frazier has acknowledged that my suggestions had no impact
28 on the report's findings and recommendations and stated that the report remained

1 independent at all times. (Frazier Deposition Excerpt, pp. 162, 199-201.) My
2 recommendation for the Frazier Group to work with these key individuals proved to be
3 extremely helpful because it was discovered that there were additional errors in the report
4 that required correction.

5 Further, Chief Frazier agreed with my suggestions and made corrections to the
6 report in direct coordination with District Attorney O'Malley. (Frazier Deposition Excerpt,
7 p. 56:6-13 ("Yes. Ms. O'Malley called me and said that she had researched that . . . and
8 that the report was incorrect, and we changed it.") I was not involved in those
9 discussions.

10 36. We recognize the need for training based on the preliminary input provided
11 during the development of the Independent Investigation. As such, OPD implemented
12 crowd management control training and began to work on the 68 recommendations put
13 forth in the Frazier Report. At the June 14, 2012 issuance of the report, 74% of the
14 Frazier Report recommendations had been completed or were underway. As a result,
15 the Occupy Oakland protests on May 1, 2012 and October 25, 2012 were largely a
16 "success" in that we had few complaints, lower levels of uses of force, and very little
17 violence—in all, OPD facilitated peaceful demonstrations. We largely attribute the
18 success of that day to providing the OPD with the needed investment for training, new
19 equipment, and resources to support the effort. This is an example of when OPD is given
20 the resources, training and equipment—it drives change and delivers results.

21 **Inherently Flawed Compliance Model**

22 37. In my first year, I have determined that the relationship and compliance
23 model between the Independent Monitoring Team ("IMT") and the City are impeding
24 efforts to achieve compliance.

25 38. The current IMT serves as both an auditor and technical advisor, and holds
26 two separate contracts for each professional services category. This dual function
27 creates an inherent conflict in the IMT's role to provide independent audits in that the IMT
28 has input on the same work that it is charged with auditing. Providing technical

1 advisement on matters that are later the subject of the IMT's audits is not a best practice
2 by audit standards and impairs independence.

3 39. General Standards, Section 3.43 of the United States Government
4 Accountability Office, Government Auditing Standards reads: *Nonaudit services provided*
5 *by auditors can impact independence of mind and in appearance in period subsequent*
6 *to the period in which the nonaudit service was provided.....For recurring audits, having*
7 *another independent audit organization perform an audit of the areas affected by the*
8 *nonaudit service may provide a safeguard that allows the audit organization that provided*
9 *the nonaudit service to mitigate the threat to its independence.*

10 40. A second development that has and continues to impede the City's ability to
11 achieve NSA compliance is the dearth of communication between Chief Warshaw and
12 key City Officials.

13 41. Frequent and constructive communication between Chief Warshaw and I is
14 fundamental to the success of the current Compliance model. If that communication is
15 impaired, Chief Warshaw and I are unable to discuss and resolve NSA Task compliance
16 issues at the highest administrative level within the Administration—that of the City
17 Administrator. Chief Warshaw clearly knows how critical the role is of City Administrator,
18 as reflected in earlier efforts to assign him additional authority and his request to assume
19 a "Shadow City Administrator" role rather than a "Shadow Chief" role. However, Chief
20 Warshaw and I have not had a face-to-face meeting since May 2012, with the exception
21 of one (1) meeting in August which included others. Similarly, we have had about the
22 same number of telephone conversations since about the same time—one telephone
23 conversation in June 2012. The non-existent communication between Chief Warshaw
24 and I has created an environment in which my role as City Administrator has been
25 impaired.

26 42. Mayor Quan, Chief Jordan and I are officials named in the Court documents
27 assigned accountability for NSA compliance. Therefore, it is imperative that healthy and
28 productive working relationships exist to achieve our common goal of NSA compliance.

1 43. Third, there are other factors in the model that impede the City's ability to
2 implement NSA compliance. The lag time between receipt of audits for the reflected
3 period of time ensures that the assessment is inherently dated and not informative to
4 current compliance work. Additionally, the infrequent communication and site visits do
5 not provide the level of technical assistance that the City and Chief Warshaw have
6 agreed to in the past.

7 44. In fact, relative to the more frequent visits, upon the issuance of the January
8 24th Court Order, the City increased the IMT's contract in the amount of \$100,000 to
9 account for enhanced technical assistance and one additional monthly visit per month. In
10 short, Chief Warshaw explained to me that on average his monthly site visits cost about
11 \$10,000 per month and, since it was February, he expected to visit approximately 10
12 extra times for the remaining calendar year. I proceeded with advancing a contract to the
13 City Council to ensure that Chief Warshaw had in place what he needed to uphold his
14 Court Order responsibilities and in the interest of getting more frequent on-site visits and
15 technical assistance. (Exh. C) Specifically, the City Council report, dated February 14,
16 states: *The court order directs the City of Oakland to expand the monitoring services*
17 *performed by Police Performance Solutions. Therefore, the City Administrator seeks*
18 *Council's authority to increase the monitoring services and compensation commensurate*
19 *with the Federal Court order compliance services...*

20 45. To date, there has been no increase in the frequency of site visits.

21 46. By April 2012, team efforts and various conversations occurring in prior
22 months between and by the IMT, Plaintiff's Attorneys, and the City concluded that the
23 OPD requires a structural change in order to accelerate task compliance and to
24 implement foundational changes needed to strengthen OPD.

25 47. The City agreed with this conclusion. Later, the City proposed an OPD
26 structural change that would have placed a full-time, on-site professional charged with
27 guiding the Chief in his efforts to achieve NSA compliance. The full time, on-site
28 individual would work directly with the City to facilitate NSA Task completion (Exh. D). At

1 a June meeting with the Mayor, Chief, Plaintiff's Attorneys, and I, we were told by Chief
2 Warsaw that the court denied the City's request for consideration of a Special Master.

3 48. Concurrent with the submittal of this request, to address issues of delayed
4 input and enhanced technical assistance, in the April/May timeframe, the City began to
5 formalize a request to Chief Warsaw for more robust and frequent technical assistance
6 in areas that we acknowledged required more focused attention and assistance with
7 problem solving in order to achieve compliance. Chief Warsaw did constructively
8 respond to the City's request and committed to provide timely feedback and assist with
9 work plans to achieve compliance with non-compliant Tasks. In a May 2012, discussion
10 between Mayor Quan, Chief Warsaw, Chief Jordan and I, the City requested: "real-
11 time" audits, enhanced technical assistance, more frequent visits from Chief Warsaw.

12 49. Chief Warsaw committed to putting in place "real-time" audits similarly to
13 what he produced for the City of Detroit. It took four months (by September 2, 2012) for
14 Chief Warsaw to produce a one-page non-binding report that provided a one paragraph
15 assessment on the three non-compliance tasks that we sought more frequent input on to
16 assess progress being made. (Exh. E) A four month delay in receiving a "real-time"
17 audit did not achieve our goal or meet our request of more timely input to inform our
18 efforts.

19 50. Chief Warsaw also committed to providing enhanced technical assistance
20 during that same meeting on Tasks that we identified needed enhanced focus. In early
21 July, when Chief Warsaw had still not fulfilled his commitment to respond to the May
22 request, I sent him an email repeating these requests and outlined the three tasks that
23 we needed enhanced technical assistance. (Exh. F) This was followed by a mid-July
24 letter from Chief Jordan to the IMT stating that the IMT should come prepared to begin
25 this work during the August visit. (Exh. G)

26 51. During the August visit, the IMT was not prepared and I was later told by
27 the Mayor that he had delayed the "ETA" on these matters to September. To date,
28 November 7, 2012, Chief Warsaw has not fully addressed the City's request for

1 enhanced technical assistance with articulated work plans.

2 52. The City requested in writing that Chief Warshaw exercise his additional
3 authority and provide OPD with “detailed directives, or actions that [he] believe[s] that the
4 City Administrator should take to advance compliance in the NSA areas identified in the
5 January 24 court order.” [June 6, 2012 Ltr. To Chief Warshaw]. Defendants
6 acknowledged the need for assistance “in helping the City remove the organizational and
7 cultural barriers that are impeding full compliance with the NSA.” [Exh D, June 6, 2012
8 Ltr. To Chief Warshaw]. The City went so far as to propose the immediate appointment
9 of a Special Master to “quickly and effectively implement needed reforms.” [Exh D, June
10 6, 2012 Ltr. To Chief Warshaw].

11 53. Nothing ever came of the City’s request for additional oversight and
12 assistance. The absence of the IMT to provide the requested level of enhanced technical
13 assistance, to provide the “real time” audits timely, directives/actions for the City
14 Administrator to take to advance compliance, and more frequent visits has powerfully
15 impacted the City’s ability to accelerate NSA compliance at a critical juncture.

16 54. The City also disputes the IMT’s determination as to the status of NSA Task
17 compliance. As set forth more specifically, the City believes that it is in compliance with
18 some tasks that the IMT has reported as not in compliance and the City believes that the
19 IMT has unilaterally changed compliance standards agreed to by the parties in the NSA.

20 55. As such, the City believes that the IMT conclusions should be reviewed to
21 determine if the IMT is using a standard which does not reflect the contractually agreed
22 upon language in the NSA. The City would like this opportunity.

23 56. My assessment of the IMT-City of Oakland working model is that the IMT
24 structure has not worked and has at a minimum contributed to the delays and duration of
25 not achieving NSA compliance. In May 2012, Chief Jordan and I began to request
26 meetings with the Court to advise the Court of this condition. In a week’s time, consistent
27 with the previous Court Orders, we asked Chief Warshaw no less than three times to
28 meet with the Court. Nothing ever came of these requests. (Exh. F)

1 **OPD Leadership Assessment and Duties**

2 57. My assessment is that the current OPD executive leadership the City,
3 namely Chief Jordan, is capable, committed and eager to lead the City to NSA
4 compliance and in its efforts to reduce crime in Oakland.

5 58. I have concluded that the OPD could benefit from training focused on
6 developing leadership skills and implementing a culture of accountability and restoration
7 of other specialized training which was reduced or discouraged during tighter budget
8 years. I continue to work with Chief Jordan to assign the appropriate resources for
9 training and to advance the rebuilding of the OPD.

10 59. For all of the reasons mentioned in this Declaration, the OPD requires a
11 model that features “hands-on, full-time” guidance to achieve NSA compliance: not a
12 receiver model. My assessment is that these fundamental changes can be achieved
13 through a Compliance Director arrangement, much like what was suggested in the
14 May/June timeframe.

15 60. This model must support at all levels in OPD: training, coaching and
16 building, accountability and OPD Command “bench” strength while concurrently
17 structurally changing many fundamental ways in which the OPD operates. This is an
18 admission that Command Staff will benefit from full-time, on-site oversight and training to
19 ensure that changes are sustainable and permanent—executive leadership training
20 which they have been denied for quite some time. I believe that this is a solution
21 because my observation is that when OPD is given the equipment, resources, and
22 training needed to change, they respond and make the needed change.


23 61. Plaintiffs' request for the appointment of a Receiver with the authority to fire
24 the Chief of Police, Assistant Chief, and Deputy Chiefs of Police is extremely concerning
25 because: (a) OPD leadership need to be the source driving the change and ensuring its
26 permanency within the OPD; (b) it sets a poor tone for achieving long-overdue positive
27 change; (c) it does not factor in the positive performance of the existing staff that hold
28 these positions; (d) it will likely result in additional turnover, resulting in delays associated

1 with "ramp up" time, a factor that which has had a negative impact on the OPD and NSA
2 compliance; and, (e) many of Chief Jordan's responsibilities and functions are unrelated
3 to NSA responsibilities. To authorize a third-party to fire Chief Jordan and his senior
4 command staff would cripple the City in many areas not related to NSA compliance—a
5 setback rather than step forward.

6 62. The authority to fire the Chief of Police would not serve the common goal of
7 task compliance. There are no performance issues that affect the current Chief's ability
8 to advance NSA task compliance. Rather, the City simply needs exactly what it
9 requested in in May/June: a full-time, on-site hands-on compliance expert that can
10 provide ongoing direction and guidance to sustain and advance permanent compliance.

11 63. Chief Jordan has the knowledge skills and abilities to lead the OPD and he
12 is the best person to do so. I also believe that the Compliance Director advocated for by
13 Defendants is the most effective, efficient, and economically viable means to bring the
14 City into full NSA Compliance.

15
16 I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
17 that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed in Oakland,
18 California on November ____, 2012.

19
20 
21 _____
22 DEANNA J. SANTANA
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